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Every now and then a decision is handed down which, at first
glance seems to strike the reader as not unusual, devoid of color,
and completely lacking in the stuff which makes intellectual pugil-
istics a great sport, but which upon more than cursory examination
shows all the aspects of being the perfect port in a stormy legal
predicament, or the solid peg upon which the lawyer can safely
hang his hat. Such a case is Liebhardt v. Avison decided on March
5, 1951 by the Supreme Court of Colorado.'
The problem presented to the Court was a future interest
problem and arose out of the following situation :2
(1) Louis Liebhardt wished to provide for the following rel-
atives: Two sisters, Minnie and Laura; two nephews, Harry and
Fred; a niece, Georgia; and Georgia's son, Jack.
(2) Louis sought to do so with the following assets: Certain
one-half interest in real estate in Denver, certain shares of stock
(representing an interest in other Denver real estate), and the
incomes from both the stock and the real estate.
(3) Louis Liebhardt's attorney set up the following trust to
accomplish his client's purposes: To Minnie and Laura as trustees
and upon the death of both to Harry and the Colorado National
Bank of Denver as successors in trust.
(4) Then to fulfill his client's wishes, Louis' attorney ar-
ranged in part the following testamentary disposition:
(a) The net income of the real estate and of the stock to
Minnie and Laura, share and share alike or to the survivor of them,
for and during their natural lives.
(b) The net income of the real estate to Georgia for and dur-
ing her natural life and to Jack 3 share and share alike upon the
death of Minnie and Laura . . . as hereinafter provided.
(c) The entire real estate to be turned over and conveyed to
Jack as and for his absolute property upon the death of Georgia
and when Jack shall have reached the age of 30 years.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
- ........ Colo ......-, 229 P. 2d 933.
2 The situation and the problem arose immediately out of paragraph six-
teen of the will of Louis Liebhardt. Other paragraphs will be mentioned later.
I As briefly presented by the Court one might read here an estate or Interest
in Jack pur autre vie (of Georgia). However the provision from paragraph
sixteen was "The share of said net income belonging to Georgia Liebhardt
Temple shall be paid to her by said successors in trust quarter-annually. The
share of said net income belonging to Jack Liebhardt Temple shall be paid to
him by said successors in trust at the rate of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00)
per month, until he reaches the age of twenty-six (26) years, and between the
age of twenty-six (26) and thirty (30) years, the said share of said net income
shall be paid to him by said successors in trust at the rate of Six Hundred Dol-
lars ($600.00) per month. The excess of said net income . . . shall be in-
vested and held in trust for him .. "
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(d) The net income of the real estate (to certain communi-
ties for memorial purposes) upon the death of Georgia and upon
the death of Jack without issue before being entitled to receive the
property (real estate) as provided (that is upon the death of
Georgia and the death of Jack prior to age 30).4
(e) The stock and the accumulations thereon to Harry and
Fred, share and share alike, upon the death of both Minnie and
Laura.
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE WILL
Grouped as to assets,5 the disposition looks as follows: (1)
Net income of real estate-to Minnie and Laura for life, then to
Georgia for life and to Jack until he reaches the age of 30 years.
Then, if Jack shall not fulfill the requirements for receiving abso-
lutely the real estate itself, the net income to go to charity. (2) The
real estate itself-in trust for Minnie and Laura, for Georgia and
Jack, then (unless Jack shall meet the requirements for receiving
absolutely the real estate) in trust for charity. (3)Net income of
the stock-to Minnie and Laura for life (survivorship etc.) then
trust ceases and (4) The stock itself-to Fred and Harry (no sur-
vivorship provided), share and share alike.
The trial court found 6 that Louis died in 1937, Laura died
intestate in 1941, Harry died later in 1941 and Minnie died in 1947,
also intestate. The Colorado National Bank filed its complaint in
the nature of interpleader when Harry's widow (together with
In view of the discussion later to follow this portion ought to be set forth
fully. Paragraph 16, subparagraph (b), is "Upon the death of Georgia Lieb-
hardt Temple, and when said Jack Liebhardt Temple shall have reached the
age of thirty (30) years, then the entire undivided one-half interest . . . shall
be turned over and conveyed to said Jack Liebhardt Temple as and for his
absolute property. Upon the death of Georgia Liebhardt Temple, and upon the
death of Jack Liebhardt Temple without issue, before being entitled to receive
and before receiving said property as above provided, then the net income of
said undivided one-half interest . . . shall be distributed, and I give, devise
and bequeath the said net income as follows: One-eighth of said net income to
the City and County of Denver, Colorado, to maintain a water and field lily
garden in Washington Park. .. ."
5This writer has deliberately placed emphasis upon the assets in order to
avoid an error which he feels T. G. M. and perhaps others may have made. In
an earlier comment on. Liebhardt v. Avison in 28 Dicta 216 (1951), T. G. M.
argues at page 217 as follows: "The condition precedent which might be in-
fered from the words 'when they reach the age of 26 years' is nullified by the
gift of income from the same property to the same persons until they reach the
age of 26 years." T. G. M. then referred to Clobberies case that if money be
given to one, to be paid at age 21 years, there, if the party dies before, it shall
go to (his) executor.
The present writer however submits that the gift of income is entirely
distinct and separate from the gift of the property (real estate) itself. It is
important to make this distinction faithfully. In this light, the "nullification"
asserted by the previous writer is not forthcoming. Moreover the specific ref-
erence to Cloberries case doe§ not support the proposition since in the reference
the concern is with only one subject matter, that is the income. In the argu-
ment there are two subject matters, the income, and the real estate itself.
6 Summarized by the court on page 934.
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the Executor under Harry's will) claimed an undivided one-half
interest in the property devised to Fred and Harry under para-
graph 16 of Louis Liebhardt's will. Fred resisted.
It seems to this writer that a proper and thorough examination
of Liebhardt v. Avison may be conducted along the following lines:
(1) By a simple examination of the stage upon which the
drama is presented.
(2) By an examination of the specific problems presented to
the Colorado court by this production.
(3) By an analysis of the direct and immediate effect of the
court's decision.
(4) By a somewhat subtle consideration of what one writer
feels are implications of the decision which may lead to certain
confusion.
THE STAGE
For some strange reason the subject "Future Interests" seems
to excite more fear than respect. This fear is justified not so much
by shades of feudal tenures and doctrines of uses as by a somewhat
unfortunate lack of certainty as to just which way a court will
lean and just what factors it will consider in that leaning on any
specific problem. Thus, it is perhaps not so much that the lawyer is
not aware that he is creating a future interest problem, as Dean
King seems to feel,7 as it is that the attorney has not been able in
the past to determine just what the state of a particular problem
is in his jurisdiction. The average prudent lawyer (there seems
to be no reason to believe that the two adjectives necessarily re-
quire separation), is capable of examining his notes and examining
the cases and texts, and drawing a contingent remainder situation
where that is his client's desire, and of distinguishing between a
vested remainder and a vested remainder subject to divestment.
But there are other factors which place the attorney in a predica-
ment. That predicament is or rather has been particularly acute in
Colorado. For example in Snyder v. O'Connor 8 (X to 5 children;
should a child die without issue, his shares to augment the other 4
children's shares) which seems to be the perfect vested remainder
subject to divestment, is called by the Colorado court a contingent
remainder. This same treatment was given by the court to interests
which seem rather to follow the orthodox vested remainder in New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown 9 and in Hickey v. Costello.,0 Then
again in Burden v. Colorado National Bank 11 (X to A for life, re-
mainder to such of the issue of A as shall survive her, if any) the
Colorado court said that this interest (which traditionally has
I See King, "Future Interests in Colorado," copyright, 1950, by Wm. C.
Brown Company, Dubuque, Iowa, at page 2.
'102 Colo. 567, 81 P. 2d 773 (1938).
S32 Colo. 365, 76 P. 799 (1904).
10 80 Colo. 461, 251 P. 595 (1927).
11 116 Colo. 111, 179 P. 2d 267 (1947).
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been called contingent) 12 is vested. Were this the only word on the
subject in Colorado the lawyer would be quite vexatiously placed.
However, there is authority to the effect that the Colorado courts
favor early vesting of interests. Hignett v. Sherman,13 Carmichael
v. Cole,1 4 Hazelwood v. Moore 15 and Jones v. Pueblo Savings & Trust
Co.'6 may be cited to support the proposition. It is submitted that
this proposition deserves the attention of the attorney since it has
become the "place to stand" from which the court will consider a
close question as to whether an interest is vested or contingent.
Thus Dean King was able to criticize the court's holding in Burden
v. Colorado National Bank by advising that perhaps the atforney can
assure his client that the interest will be contingent if he inserts
a clause such as "it being my intention that no remainderman
hereunder shall take any vested interest unless he survives the life
tenant". 1 7 While that comment was directed specifically to the
Burden case, it might well have described the condition of con-
tingent remainders in Colorado but for another condition sur-
veyed by Dean King in the same chapter. Dean King summarizes
the status of vested remainders thus: "There seems to be no con-
sistency in Colorado cases on vesting.' 8 This, then, is the stage or
the background for Liebhardt v. Avison-a lack of consistency, but
a leaning toward early vesting of interest.
"2 See Casner and Leach, "Cases and Text on Property," Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1950, at page 354 and 355. The following is taken directly:
"(1) 'To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs if B survives A.'-contingent.
(2) 'To A for life, remainder to such children of A as shall survive A and their
heirs.'-contingent. The children to take are not ascertain until it is deter-
mined which ones survive A. (3) 'To A for life, remainder to B and his heirs,
but if B does not survive A, then to C and his heirs.' B's remainder is vested;
it is subject to a condition subsequent and is thus distinguishable from case
(1) above. Yes, the difference is only in the form of expression and doesn't
make very good sense. But the disposition of millions of dollars of property
have turned upon this type of verbal distinction and continues to do so."
See also Spitz "An Elementary Treatise on Conditional and Future Interest
in Property," Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1933, Chapter II.
Thus in Festing v. Allen (12 M. & W. 279), 1843, where the devise was to
A for life, remainder to her children who shall attain 21, in default of issue
over (A is survived by 3 minor children), the Court held that the children
had contingent remainders in fee. "None of the children having attained ma-
jority when the particular estate determined by death, the remainder to them
was defeated."
But see also Astley v. Micklethwait, 15 ch. D. 59, 1880, in which the prin-
ciple was criticized as applying to both legal and equitable estates limited in
remainder, when in fact it applies only to legal estates so limited.
See also footnote 22.
1375 Colo. 64, 224 P. 411 (1924).
14 83 Colo. 575, 267 P. 408 (1928).
100 Colo. 556, 59 P. 2d 248 (1937).
* 103 Colo. 455, 87 P. 2d (1939).
" King, supra, page 75.
"King, supra, page 70. Dean King pressed the comment with a criticism
of Fisher v. Minshall, 102 Colo. 154, 78 P. 2d 363 (1938), in which an interest
is called a contingent remainder, when in fact it did not seem to him to be a
remainder at all.
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The problem presented to the court was whether under the
will of Louis Liebhardt a vested remainder 19 was created in Fred
and Harry, so that upon the death of Harry that portion of the
property in controversy became a part of his estate and under his
will passed to and is vested in his widow, Avison. The court af-
firmed the trial court finding that the interest was vested.
Briefly summarized, the court based its position on the follow-
ing propositions: (1) The rule of construction announced in
Hignett v. Sherman that, "Unless the expressed intention of the
testator clearly appears in the will to the contrary, an absolute,
rather than a qualified, a vested, rather than a contingent, interest
or estate is created." The court further referred to Carmichael v.
Cole that, "unless the expressed intention of the testatrix clearly
appears in the will to the contrary, a vested, rather than a con-
tingent, interest is created. '20 (2) The rule that the estate vests at
the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears from
the will, for which proposition the court referred to the same
authorities as in the previous proposition. (3) The presumption
against joint tenancies. This came in answer to the Plaintiff in
Error's assertion that Harry and Fred took'as a class and that
Fred took all as surviving member of the class. (4) The cardinal
rule of the interpretation of wills, which is to determine the in-
tention of the testator. Here the court found that while in the
case of Minnie and Laura he devised to them, "share and share
alike or to the survivor of them", in the case of Harry and Fred he
devised simply "share and share alike". The court noted that the
testator stopped short of providing that the survivor should take
("although it is clear from other portions of the will that he knew
how to so provide"), and called to play another rule of construction,
(5) that the use of different words in a will, applying to the same
subject matter, indicates that the testator had in view different
results. (6) The same rule of construction as in the preceding
proposition, but applied to the distinction between the manner in
which the testator provided for the deferment of vesting in Jack
but did not so provide in the case of Harry and Fred.
The court summarized its position as follows: "It thus be-
comes evident from a study of other paragraphs of testator's will
that he could, and did, by apt language, defer the vesting of a re-
mainder to a time subsequent to his own death, make such vesting
dependent upon the survival of the remaindermen until such time,
"1This writer takes the position that the term "vested remainder" means
exactly what it says and does not have to be preceded by the term "indefeasible"
to distinguish it from a "vested remainder subject to defeasance." The argu-
ment will be presented under the last of the four sub-topics in this analysis.
21 To further amplify its position the Court referred to Jones v. Pueblo Sav-
ings and Trusts Co., 103 Colo. 45, 87 P. 2d 2, 4, that "The law favors the vest-
ing of estates especially when given to children or those standing in like rela-
tion . . . the Court will construe a vested remainder if possible." (The court
then noted that Louis left no children and that except for the two sisters Harry
and Fred were his next of kin.)
DICTA
Nov., 1951
and direct the disposition of the remainder in the event of the
death of the remaindermen prior to the time fixed for such vesting.
We can only conclude that the testator himself had fully in mind
the difference between a contingent and a vested remainder. By
the application of the rule in Williams v. Fundingsland, we must
conclude that testator did not intend to create a contingent re-
mainder by (the paragraph under consideration) '.21
EFFECT OF THE DECISION
The writer, of course, does not propose to state what the
effect of the decision is, but rather, in the light of the Colorado
cases, to offer what he reasonably expects that effect to be. That
expectation can be simply stated. The court has reasserted its
position that, "The law prefers the vesting of estates." There is
actually no departure from the principles of the common law, since
vested remainders, contingent remainders and executory interests
were clearly preferred in that order.22 There is, however, a degree
of certainty, in the statements of judicial policy herein, which is
now available to the Colorado lawyer in the drafting of instruments
and in the preparation for the litigation of existing instruments.
There is, of course, no assurance that tomorrow the court would
not say, "Colorado prefers contingent remainders," but to the de-
gree within which the court operates within the framework of its
judicial precedent, it seems to this writer that Liebhardt v. Avison
very nicely gratifies the lawyer's search for consistency in this
future interest problem in Colorado. It would seem that if Hignett
v. Sherman and Liebhardt v. Avison can be relied upon, Dean
King's critical analysis will no longer be justified. It seems also
that Dean King's second suggestion (that if you do not want a
vested remainder, make provisions in no uncertain terms) has
been justified by Liebhardt v. Avison.
It is not so much the court's statement of preferential treat-
ment of the vested remainder that concerns this writer but rather
a suggestion directed to the opinion by T.G.M. who commented on
this case earlier in Dicta.
23
11 Liebhardt v. Avison, supra, at 937.
22 See for example Moynihan, "Preliminary Survey of Real Property," West
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1940, p. 66, "The courts have generally favored
construing doubtful language as creating a vested rather than a contingent
interest."
Moynihan compares Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen 223 (Mass., 1861),
and Bally v. Strahan, 314 Ill. 213, 145 N. E. 359 (1924), to Ryan v. Beshk, 339
Ill. 45, 170 N. E. 699, 130. In the former, "A to B for life, then to B's children,
but if any child die before B, his share to go to surviving children"-each
child had a vested remainder subject to divestment. In the latter, "A to B
for life, then to such of the children of B as survive him"-each child has a
contingent remainder. Moynihan adds, "In the latter case the remaindermen
are unascertained because of the condition precedent of survivorship." This
writer would criticize the comment, however, in the same manner and for the
same reason that he does another writer's approach. See infra paragraph 5 under
"Implication of Unorthodoxy."
21 Liebhardt v. Avison: Remainders and Revisions, 28 Dicta 215, 216 (1951).
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That writer's position can perhaps be briefly stated as follows:
In arriving at the conclusion that Harry had a vested remainder,
the. court relied on rules of construction, one of which was that
where the testator created a contingent remainder in one part of
the will, but omits such limitations as to Harry, a different result
was intended. However, that writer continues, what the court in
its comparison and analysis overlooks is that the interest referred
to as a contingent remainder is really a vested remainder subject
to divestment. Thus that writer feels that "erroneous inferences
may be drawn".2 4 It seems to the present writer, however, that no
such improper analysis was present in the court's decision and
that, therefore, these implications of unorthodoxy do not exist.
The court was primarily concerned with paragraph 16 of the
will which was analyzed above. In Paragraphs 2 to 14 of the will,
testator provided other outright gifts but in most cases provided
for their lapsing and falling into the residuum if the named bene-
ficiary be not living at the time of his death. In Paragraph 15
Louis created another trust in which he placed real estate, and
securities as a protective fund. The Colorado National Bank was
named successor trustee. Harry and Georgia were named as life
tenants as to the net income from both the real estate and the fund,
(the income from the fund not to be paid until ten years after
Leuis' death). On death of one life tenant, the incomes were to go to
survivor with remainder over after the death of the second life
tenant, to the issue of Georgia "living at the time of testator's
death" in equal shares "when they reach the age of 26 years."
Finally, "in case Georgia's issue living at the time of testator's
death, die without issue before reaching the age of twenty-six
years, and before receiving the trust property" then, the trustee
shall pay over the income to certain religious institutions.
T.G.M. TAKES DANGEROUS POSITION
T.G.M. in construing paragraph 15 claims that the remainder
was not contingent as the Colorado court asserts, but was vested
subject to divestment. Were the analysis correct, T.G.M. most
certainly would have exhibited a dangerous quandary to the dismay
of the practicing attorney. T.G.M. cites Simes for the proposition
that "where a devise is to a remainderman at the death of the life
tenant . .. the authorities declare that such words relate to the
time of enjoyment and that the remainder is vested. ' 25 The analy-
sis is'acceptable as far as it goes, but this writer submits that the
sound principle is not intended to operate in such a grandiose man-
ner in the face of an additional and prior requirement that the
vesting as well as the enjoyment depends on the taker's being alive
at the time of the testator's death. Thus while there is no quarrel
' T. G. M. uses the terms "erroneous inferences" and "may lead to unortho-
dox conclusions" synonomously throughout his criticism.
SSimes, The Law of Future Interests, (1936) Section 74, note 26, citing
among others an Iowa case, Dowd v. Scally, 174 N. W. 938 (1919).
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with the proposition that X to A for life, then to B upon the death
of A, gives B an immediate vested remainder, it certainly does not
follow that X to A for life, then to B, if B be alive at the time of tes-
tator's death comes within that rule. In this respect the court prop-
erly found the remainder in B contingent. Nor does the court
argue that the requirement that "payment (enjoyment) be post-
poned until B is 26 years of age" is a contingent remainder as
T.G.M. seems to find. The court, having properly found the re-
mainder expressly contingent upon B's being alive at the testator's
death does not deny that B, having fulfilled the condition precedent,
then has a vested remainder with enjoyment postponed and also
subject to divestment if he has no issue at age 26. It does not in
the least contradict the court's holding in Clobberie's case as
T.G.M.'s fourth point seems to suggest.
T.G.M. further argues that "the identity of each remainder
was as definitely determined as if he had said Mary, James and
John, children of Georgia. ' 26 May I suggest first that he stops
short of the full explanation of a contingent remainder, implying
that only when the taker is unascertainable or indeterminable is
there a contingent remainder. The other half of the criterion, of
course, is ". . . or if the event on which it is limited to take effect
remains uncertain. '27 Moreover, following the assumption and
with a mere reference to the Restatement, T.G.M. states that "this
present identification" (?) "tends to establish that survival is not
a condition precedent." Perhaps a suggestion of the law's pre-
sumpuiun as u liUlla.li aldJti LVu 1r1J1UUUuCA Vlll Cl-eal, sonmie UUUUb
as to the "definitely determined" and "present identification". The
point can no longer be pursued without danger of embarrassment to
persons who unfortunately are serving as legal guinea-pigs.
POSSIBLE UNORTHODOX RESULTS
It is submitted that there are, however, two sound approaches
to this problem, which neither the court nor T.G.M. touched upon,
which might "lead to unorthodox results." First in Gray's old
stand-by that it stands ready to become possessory wherever and
however a preceding estate is terminated. ' 28 If the law's presump-
tion as to man's capacity can be dissuaded here, it would seem that,
though the issue of Georgia may precede the testator in death, for
the period of time during which the issue did persist, he stands
ready to become possessory, etc. Thus, the vested remainder which
T.G.M. sought to establish might well be so to Gray. Second is
the test suggested by the Colorado court in Hignett v. Sherman
which is only slightly different from Gray's. That suggestion is that
the distinction between contingent and vested remainders has to
2828 Dicta 215, 217 (1951).
27 Leach, Cases on Future Interests, (2d ed.) p. 56; New York Real Property
Law, section 40; Moynihan, supra, p. 65; Fearne, C. R. 3, 4; 1 Reeves, Real
Property 96; 1 Tiffany, Real Property, section 118.
'sGray, Rule Against Perpetuities, section 9.
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do not with the time when the remainder becomes a present or
possessory interest, but with the time when the remainder vests in
the sense that it stands ready to become so if the immediate prior
interest now terminates. I submit that here, too, this interest might
be vested since should the emphasis be placed on the possible death
of the life tenant at any time during the life of Georgia's issue
which persists at the testator's death, he would meet the test.
The question arises: If at the time of the creation of the
interest Georgia had no issue, then the remainder would be singu-
larly contingent. Would T.G.M. then argue that the particular
usage of the words "absolute," "without issue" and "postponed en-
joyment" 29 point to a distinction between vested and contingent?
I think not. Obviously the determination as to vested or contingent
is established, as the court found, prior to the introduction of the
above mentioned defeasance considerations, by the condition pre-
cedent that the issue survive the testator. The conclusion is that
once the issue survived the testator as required, his contingent re-
mainder is converted into a vested remainder 30 (awaiting only the
termination of the life estate to become possessory), enjoyment of
which is postponed, and which is then subject to defeasance if he
has no issue on his 26th birthday.
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Several other assertions made by T.G.M. require considera-
tion. That writer states, "It seems strange that this idea of vest-
ing subject to divestment as opposed to absolute vesting does not
appear in the court's reasoning. It quotes the conclusions of law
of the trial court wherein the idea is twice expressed: '. . . Fred
... and Harry... each took an indefeasibly vested remainder . . .'
and '. . . Fred . . . and Harry . . . each took an indefeasibly vested
interest.' "31 This "idea" referred to is, of course, nothing more
than a rule of property law as old as the vested remainder itself;
I am sure the court has considered it. In fact the court treats the
"idea" in the only place it is applicable to the problem before it
when it surveys paragraphs 2 to 14 and notes that "in most cases
(he) provided for their lapsing and falling into the residuum in
the event the named beneficiary is not living at the time of his
death. ' 32 For that matter the "idea" has no place in a discussion
of the interest left to Harry and Fred and if used in any way but
in a non-technical sense, for purposes of placing emphasis on the
certainty of the vesting as opposed to a contingency, the trial court
was in error and the court did well to omit it. As to Fred and
Harry the words were "Upon the death of Minnie and Laura I
give all my stock . . . to Fred and Harry, share and share alike."
There is not one suggestion of a condition subsequent, a special
128 Dicta 215, 18 (1951).
"Moynihan, supra, p. 65, "A contingent remainder becomes a vested remain-
der if the condition precedent is fulfilled and if the i:emainderman is ascer-
tained before termination of the preceding estate."
28 Dicta 215, 221 (1951).
12 Liebhardt v. Avison, 229 P. 2d 933, 937.
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limitation, or an executory devise; in fact there is nothing more
than a vested remainder.
Again that writer states, "Furthermore, the Brief and Ar-
gument of Defendants in Error contained this language. (1) 'We
shall now demonstrate that the language of this subparagraph (c)
is the language of immediate and absolute vesting . . .' and (2)
'.. . unless the expressed intention of the testator clearly appears
in the will to the contrary, an absolute, rather than a qualified, a
vested rather than a contingent interest or estate is created'." 33
The present writer submits, however, that such emphasis is clearly
outside the context of the particular usage and without justifica-
tion. As to the first quotation, the full paragraph appears on page
11 of the Defendant in Error's Brief and followed this statement:
"Subparagraph (c) contains no provision for deferment of vesting
as does subparagraph (b)." The full paragraph continued the
argument thus: "We think that in each instance .the testator's in-
tention is perfectly clear, but our primary concern is with sub-
paragraph (c), and we shall now demonstrate that the language
of the subparagraph is the language of immediate and absolute
vesting at the moment of testator's death, and the fact that Harry
Liebhardt died before Minnie Liebhardt, the surviving life tenant,




Rea- i the context- t.-en, it appears that the first asser-
tion was not well taken, since the attorney clearly uses the word
"absolute" to emphasize the distinction he asserts between con-
tingent and vested. As to the second quotation, this writer regrets
that he was unable to discover this in the direct argument of the
attorney. But nevertheless the statement itself contains the de-
struction of the proposition for which it was cited. There the term
"absolute" is specifically declared to be contrasted to the term
'contingent", and synomously compared with the term "vested".
This writer notes that the Colorado court in one of the cases cited
by the attorney is "loose" in the same sense as to the word "abso-
lute", and suggests that the attorney was clearly following judicial
precedent in comparing the vested with the contingent remainder.
This citation was from Hignett v. Sherman and appears on page
13 of the Brief as follows: "... an absolute rather than a qualified,
a vested rather than a contingent interest or estate is created."
The attorney on the very next page wisely quotes from Carmichael
v. Cole in which the court cited Hignett v. Sherman this way . ..
"Unless the expressed intention of the testatrix clearly appears in
the will to the contrary, a vested rather than a contingent interest
is created."
'328 Dicta 215, 221 (1951).
"Brief and Argunient of Defendants in Error, p. 11, Supreme Court of
Colorado No. 16328.
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This writer did find, however, ample passages from the attor-
ney's Brief to substantiate the proposition that the problem con-
sidered was that of vested versus contingent, and that he did not
allude to vested subject to defeasance. Thus on page 18: ". . . in
subparagraph (c) there is complete absence of any provision for
deferment of vesting." Thus on page 19: ". . . only the enjoyment
was deferred." Thus on page 32: ". . at all times from and after
the death of Louis Liebhardt each of his nephews had a vested
interest which he could transfer inter vivos." Finally in the conclu-
sion, after citing authorities the attorney states, "These words
created a vested remainder in both Harry Liebhardt and Fred
Liebhardt within all the above quoted definitions. ' 5
ANOTHER POINT DESERVES DISCUSSION
That writer quotes as follows from the opinion: "Counsel argue
that the interest which Harry ... took should be treated as a lapsed
legacy... This argument could only be applicable in the event that
Harry's . . . interest . . . was a contingent, instead of a vested re-
mainder. It cannot apply as long as Harry ... has a vested remain-
der, because if it is the latter it then becomes part of his estate and
is disposed of by his will . . ." Then that writer makes the following
criticism: "From the above, erroneous inferences may be drawn;
first because it seems to be based upon the assumption that no con-
tingent remainder can be inherited or devised (which is not the
authority) and. second because of the apparent implication that
every vested remainder goes to the heirs or devisee of the remain-
der," and the writer adds, "not so if it were a life estate or remain-
der subject to defeasance under circumstances . . . such as Jack
here."
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This writer submits that neither inference can fairly be drawn
from the Opinion. Perhaps a quoting of the full paragraph, and
a reading of that paragraph within the context of the whole case
would have prevented such assertions as above drawn. The full
paragraph is: "This argument (of counsel that Harry's legacy
lapsed) could only be applicable in the event that Harry's interest
under this paragraph was a contingent instead of a vested re-
mainder. It cannot apply as long as Harry has a vested remainder,
because if it is then it then becomes part of his estate . . .- 37
May I suggest that the court was concerned here only. with the
problem of contingent versus vested, and that if it had been a
contingent situation, it would have been one of the specific situa-
tions contemplated by the lapsed legacy rule 3-that is the death
of the remainderman prior to the death of the life tenant. But this
was not the situation. May I further suggest that the court in speak-
SIbid, p. 21.
28 Dicta 215, 222 (1951).
'T Liebhardt v. Avison, 29 P. 2d 933, 93'8.
"For the latest Colorado expression see Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599,
221 P. 2d 357 (1950), in which the Court applies the lapsed legacy doctrines
where devisee preceded the testator in death, no substitution or provision for the
contingency having been made.
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ing of "Harry's vested remainder" was not including a vested re-
mainder subject to defeasance nor was it concerned with a vested
remainder for life. The court was concerned with, and the language
was framed around the specific use of the terms as to the present
factual situation. That was simply a vested remainder, which by
definition is not a vested remainder subject to defeasance, and
which as specifically used by the court did not involve a life estate.
One.more comment. The court referred to Section 4, Article
12, Chapter 40, Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935 as being applicable to Lieb-
hardt v. Avison and found that a joint tenancy rather than a ten-
ancy in common was created. In his article entitled "Reversions
and Revisions" T.G.M. demonstrates that Section 47, Article 1,
Chapter 40, Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935 specifically prohibits a construc-
tion of this Article so as to embrace last wills and testaments. The
former writer then suggests that a revision of the Article ought
to be forthcoming from the Legislature.39 To the extent that the
former writer's comment was intended as a constructive criticism
of the Legislature and not a criticism of the means used by the court
to correct the error of Section 47, this writer finds himself in full
agreement.
The full text of Section 4, Article 1, Chapter 40, Colo. Stat.
Ann. 1935 upon which the court found a joint tenancy is as fol-
lows: "No estate in joint tenancy, in any lands, tenements, or
hereditaments, shall be held or claimed under any grant, devise or
conveyance whatsoever hereafter unless the premises therein men-
tioned be thereby expressly declared to pass, not in tenancy in
common, but in joint tenancy." As amended by the Session Laws
of 1939 there was added to the statute an easy means of creating
a tenancy in common, if desired, by the words "provided always
that such expressed declaration as aforesaid shall be deemed ef-
fective to create an estate in joint tenancy, whether in grant,
devise, or conveyance hereafter made..
Except for the restriction placed on Article 1 by Section 47,
the clear import is that the statute shall cover not only conveyances
and grants (see Leadville v. Coronada Min. Co.40 "The word 'con-
vey' is the equivalent of the word 'grant'.") but also devises. The
court early found it necessary to disregard Section 47 for in the
principal case of Estate of Kwatowski 41 the Colorado court said,
"In the absence of an affirmative declaration that the estate de-
vised is in joint tenancy, an estate in tenancy in common will be
devised, unless it clearly and explicitly appears from the language
employed that the testator understood the nature and incidents of
the different estates and intended to create a joint tenancy." It
seems to this writer that the court is on firm ground in so con-
struing Article 1. As has been shown, Sec. 4(a) of Article 1,
1"28 Dicta 215, 222 (1951).
4029 Colo. 17, 67 P. 289.
4194 Colo. 222, 29 P. 2d 639. See also Miller v. Buyer, 82 Colo. 474, 261 P.
659. Concerning the transfer of estates by means other than conveyances see
Patton on Titles, Ch. 10, Sec. 278 and Sec. 279.
DICTA.
Nov., 1951
specifically provides for devise. Section 48 provides for recording
of wills. Section 50 provides for recording "of any such certified
will and probate ... to any real estate so devised by will." Section
41 permits fraternal orders to purchase, grant, devise, give real
estate, etc. Section 8 provides that "every estate in lands which
shall be granted, conveyed or devised . . . shall be deemed a fee
simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by ex-
press words, or does not appear to be granted, devised or conveyed
by operation of law." Other than those sections cited the remainder
of the 51 sections of Article 1 prescribe conduct peculiar to con-
veyancing inter vivos, such as acknowledgments, after acquired
title, mortgages, seal, foreign deeds, and the office of the clerk in
relation thereto. Thus while it is incontestable that a strict appli-
cation of Section 47 to the article would restrict the article to con-
veyances, at least five of the sections specifically involve wills, and
the remainder pertain to matters peculiar to conveyances inter
vivos. Therefore, until the revision suggested by T.G.M. is forth-
coming, it is well that the court has recognized the inconsistency of
the Legislature's surface attempt to limit the whole article and
has judiciously chosen to disregard it. The only reasonable con-
struction is to apply Section 47 to those sections peculiar to con-
veyances inter vivos, and to interpret it so as not to apply to those
specifically concerned with wills or devises.
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